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ELEMENTS OF LIBERAL EQUALITY: INTRODUCTION TO
KIRP, HOCHSCHILD, AND STRAUSS
LAWRENCE C. BECKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Articles published in this symposium on equality are rich
and diverse. Because they address such widely different aspects of
the general theme and begin and end in medias res, it may be use-
ful to sketch a common context for them.
My approach here will outline six fundamental elements of the
notion of equality embedded in democratic political theory as it is
currently understood and practiced in liberal democracies, and
then show how these elements, combined with two crucial back-
ground assumptions, generate three normative principles relevant
to the symposium Articles. The background assumptions relate to
political individualism and benevolence. I label the six fundamen-
tal elements of liberal equality equal expertise, worth, potential,
power, vulnerability, and autonomy. From all of this, three com-
plex normative principles emerge, each of special interest for one
of the Articles: a principle of equal consideration, for David Kirp's
discussion of fetal hazards; equal happiness, for Jennifer
Hochschild's analysis of the concept of the American dream; and
equal opportunity, for David Strauss's essay on the same theme.
My intention is not to argue that all of this apparatus is implicit
in the Articles to follow. Rather, my purpose is to provide a useful
framework for understanding how the Articles are connected, or
perhaps opposed, to one another and to this introduction.
II. FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF POLITICAL
INDIVIDUALISM
Equality is at the center of political and legal theory in all de-
mocracies. Of course, the formal principle of equality-that equals
* Professor of Philosophy and Kenan Professor of Humanities, College of William and
Mary. B.A., Midland College, 1961; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1965.
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must be treated equally-is generally implicit in the very idea of
rational deliberation and rule-governed conduct. If a given rule
justifies A in doing X, then it will justify the same thing for any
relevantly similar person in similar circumstances. This equal
treatment rule has been called the rule of justice1 and held to be
part of the "inner morality" of all law.2 Such a purely formal prin-
ciple is, however, obviously not enough for democracy. As Aristotle
pointed outs a parallel principle of inequality complements the
equal treatment rule: unequals should be treated unequally. Anti'-
democratic theorists can claim to satisfy both sides of this formal
principle by arguing that people are in many relevant respects une-
qual. Defenders of democracy, and more particularly, defenders of
liberal democratic legal doctrines of equal protection, need a sub-
stantive account of equality which, when combined with the formal
principle, will yield policies consistent with democratic aims.
We may reasonably assume that any substantive account of lib-
eral equality must be predicated on the following notions of politi-
cal individualism in order to be faithful to the premises of liber-
alism: first, that the ultimate justification for law, government, and
social institutions generally is their role in contributing to the wel-
fare of individuals; and second, that the measure of success for a
policy, principle, rule, or practice is how much it contributes to
aggregate individual welfare. The perfectibility of a given social or-
der, the preservation of a certain cultural tradition, and the integ-
rity of a particular nation are, therefore, secondary concerns. The
primary concern is always how well individuals fare in social or
legal structures.
We can expect this ultimate commitment to individualism to
shape the normative import of equality doctrines in important
ways. An analogous dissection of equality in the framework of so-
1. See CHAIM J. PERELMAN, JUSTICE 21-24 (1967).
2. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964). The author details eight routes by
which the attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry. When taken
together, the first (failure to achieve rules at all), third (abuse of retroactive legislation),
fourth (failure to make rules understandable), and fifth (enactment of contradictory rules)
entail the equal treatment rule. Id.
3. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
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cial democratic theory, or communitarian or collectivist political
theory, would likely have quite a different cast.4
III. FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF EQUALITY
At least six elements of a substantive account of liberal equality
are distinguishable. Liberal theory treats all of them as quasi-de-
scriptive matters-observations about the nature of moral agents
that contribute rather directly to normative issues.5
A. Equal Expertise
The equal expertise principle holds that, for all competent moral
agents, each individual is the best judge of his or her own welfare,
and that for epistemic reasons alone, others cannot properly sub-
stitute their judgments on such matters for the individual's own
judgment. A strong version holds that the quality of personal expe-
rience is private, and is the determining factor in judging how well
one's life is going. Direct knowledge of someone's welfare is there-
fore necessarily self-knowledge and is superior to any "outsider's"
indirect knowledge. Paternalistic intervention, even for intimate
acquaintances, is thus always suspect. A weak version of equal ex-
pertise holds only that making accurate, detailed assessments of
another's welfare is difficult for anyone and insuperably difficult
for anyone without intimate acquaintance with the other. Pater-
nalistic policies directed toward large groups of people are thus al-
ways suspect, even though case-by-case interventions by knowl-
edgeable people may not be.
Of course, many other possible versions of the equal expertise
doctrine exist. One that might be called the Austrian ignorance
principle, for example, states that no one can ever know enough
about the welfare of enough people to do efficient, detailed central
planning on a large scale.' We must, however, be careful not to
4. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY at
xiv (1983) (providing an account of equality embedded in an attempt "to describe a society
where no social good serves or can serve as a means of domination").
5. Cf. AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 20-41 (1980) (arguing that an assumption about
equal passions underlies utilitarian arguments for liberalism, while an assumption about
equal rationality underlies Kantian arguments).
6. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 98-100 (1988).
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follow these permutations out to an absurd form of subjectivism.
Equal expertise about subjective welfare does not entail equal ex-
pertise in dealing with objective matters. Discussions of equality
dependent upon an equal expertise doctrine benefit by explicit at-
tention to which version is needed for the argument being made,
and whether that version is plausible.
B. Equal Unique Worth
Equal unique worth is quite a different sort of doctrine, ontologi-
cal rather than epistemological. It holds that all moral agents-and
perhaps by extension all human beings, whether full-fledged agents
or not-are unique, and have equivalent intrinsic worth. In its
strongest form, the doctrine provides that each moral agent is of
infinite and incomparable intrinsic worth and that no "price" legit-
imately can be put on the life of even "the least" of us. Whether
buttressed by religious beliefs about the unconditional love of God,
Kantian discussions of respect for the dignity of an autonomous
person,7 or a vivid appreciation of the nature of subjectivity,8 the
point is familiar and absolutist. But there are other ways of under-
standing the equal worth principle, and again the ambiguity cre-
ates difficulties for political and legal argument. Even in what is
probably its weakest form, however, it is the potent doctrine that
moral agents are not fungible, and that insofar as they are autono-
mous, self-conscious beings, they have equal intrinsic worth. The
fact that the version one adopts will have dramatic effects on equal
protection controversies should be clear.
C. Equal Potential
Equal potential asserts that all normally formed human beings
begin life with mental and physical capacities that give them
equivalent possibilities for human excellence, accomplishment, and
individual well-being. The doctrine does not make the absurd
7. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29-33 (Lewis W.
Beck trans., 1959) (1785).
8. See especially the discussion of being-for-itself in JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTH-
INGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENOMALOGICAL ONTOLOGY 73-218 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956)




claim that people have identical capacities, so that each begins life
capable of developing the ability to do everything that anyone else
can do. Rather, it is the claim that (a) there are various sorts of
human excellence, superlative accomplishment, and well-being,
and (b) each of us has the capacity-though, of course, not neces-
sarily the ability-to achieve these things in some form. Natural
and social circumstances, and our own and others' conduct, deter-
mine which, if any, of our capacities we will realize.
The development of liberal democratic theory and practice over
the last three centuries reflects the increasing prominence and
scope of the equal potential doctrine, notably with regard to sex,
race, ethnicity, and natal social or economic class. Studies that
purport to undercut the doctrine, by assembling evidence of une-
qual potential for such groups, continue;9 however, the method-
ologically respectable studies now concern such small differences' °
that their logical relevance to issues of public policy and political
theory is questionable. The studies do nothing, for example, to un-
dercut arguments for equal consideration, equal protection, and
equal opportunity.
D. Equal Power
Equal power asserts that mature moral agents in similar situa-
tions all have equivalent powers of deliberation, choice, and action,
at least with respect to managing their own lives, and complying
with moral, legal, and customary rules. A strong version of this
doctrine is familiar from libertarian political theory: unless others
actively coerce them, or circumstances force them into ignorant,
nondeliberative, or involuntary action, people are fully responsible
for their conduct, both morally and legally. Incentive, no matter
how strong, is not compulsion, and choice can be free, even in the
absence of alternatives. Weaker versions of the equal power doc-
trine invoke notions of widespread diminished responsibility stem-
9. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. JENSEN, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achieve-
ment, in GENETICS AND EDUCATION 69 (1972). This article touched off fierce and continuing
debate. See THE I.Q. CONTROVERSY: CRITICAL READINGS 74-279 (Ned J. Block & Gerald
Dworkin eds., 1976).
10. For a sustained argument on the point, see MICHAEL SCHIFF & RICHARD LEWONTIN,
EDUCATION AND CLASS: THE IRRELEVANCE OF I.Q. GENETIC STUDIES (1986).
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ming from structural features of our psyches such as systematic
deliberative errors, self-deception, and motivational defects. These
versions also attribute diminished responsibility to our choice situ-
ations, such as oppressive social arrangements. In this view, incen-
tive can rise to the level of coercion, and no choice is free in the
absence of viable alternatives. The limit of the weak view is that
no one has genuine "powers" of the sort required for our tradi-
tional notions of moral and legal responsibility. Clearly, however,
such a view is inconsistent with the premises of liberal democracy.
E. Equal Vulnerability
Equal vulnerability recognizes that no one is immune to bad for-
tune or invulnerable to the actions of others. We are all equal in
that respect. Those who are especially strong, wealthy, talented,
attractive, or energetic may protect themselves against many
things, but not against all things. In many cases, the traits that
make them special also make them vulnerable to special dangers.
At one end of the spectrum is the conviction that all of this evens
out in the end; that when we sum it all up, we are equally vulnera-
ble in a very strong sense. At the other end is the actuarial evi-
dence in favor of significant inequalities between social groups (for
example, in longevity), tempered by the recognition that what is
true of a group may not be true of a given individual in that group.
Here too, the version of equality one accepts has significant conse-
quences for eventual policy decisions. The strongest version of
equal vulnerability supports a sort of quietism; weaker versions do
not.
F. Equal Autonomy
Equal (moral) autonomy holds that, within the bounds of their
natural duties, moral agents are self governing. They are not
bound morally to any social or political arrangement to which they
have not consented and/or to which they have refused to assent.
The equal autonomy principle represents the cluster of ideas that
underlies all modern social contract theory. First, certain require-
ments of reason, or laws of nature, may govern the conduct of all
[Vol. 34:89
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moral agents, even in a prepolitical state of nature." Second, be-
yond the bounds defined by such natural duties, no moral agent
has any natural, or supernaturally given, legitimate authority over
any other.'2 Third, mere power or might does not create legitimate
authority." Finally, we may each make morally binding commit-
ments which create legitimate political authority. The familiar lo-
cution here is that the consent of the governed legitimizes govern-
ment and is ultimately the only thing that legitimizes it. Moreover,
government legitimacy ultimately requires unanimity in some
sense, whether in the form of people's consent to primary, duty-
imposing rules, their consent to secondary, procedural, and power-
conferring rules, 4 or their general or common will for such
things. 15
The terms "consent" and "ultimate" are of course the keys to
deep difficulties in the social contract idea. Must there be actual
explicit consent, or will implied consent suffice? May we treat
some sort of passive acquiescence as equivalent to consent? May
we go further and hold, as do hypothetical contract theorists,1 6
that our political institutions are legitimate if they are what actual
(or perhaps ideally) rational moral agents would agree to under re-
alistic (or perhaps ideally fair) bargaining conditions? 7 These mat-
ters are controversial, but some substantial version of an equal au-
tonomy principle is undeniably embedded in liberal democratic
theory and practice.
11. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109-32 (Herbert Schneider ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1958) (1651); JOHN LocKS, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-303 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge U. Press 1967) (1690). Among contemporaries, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
114-17 (1971). All explicitly mention such natural laws or natural duties. The candidates for
such duties usually include parental and filial obligation, fairness, respecting rights to life,
liberty, and property.
12. See LocK, supra note 11, at 348-68; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT 13-21
(Charles M. Sherover ed. & trans., New Am. Lib. 1974) (1762).
13. See LOCKE, supra note 11, at 348-68; ROUSSEAU, supra note 12, at 13-21.
14. For the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW 78-79 (7th ed. 1975).
15. The notion of a "general" will is developed in ROUSSEAU, supra note 12, at 27-31, 39-
53.
16. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1985); RAWLS, supra note 11, at 356-62.
17. GAUTHIER, supra note 16, at 358-60.
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IV. THE ASSUMPTION OF LIMITED BENEVOLENCE
The six elements of equality outlined above have significant con-
sequences for liberal democratic legal theory and public policy, at
least when combined with one relatively uncontroversial normative
premise. We can understand that premise, typically called limited
benevolence, in a quasi-descriptive way. The limited benevolence
principle provides that, in addition to purely selfish concerns, peo-
ple standardly do-and ought to-take a direct, benevolent inter-
est in the welfare of others.
Long ago, Joseph Butler argued convincingly against psychologi-
cal egoism in favor of benevolence as an independent motivational
principle.18 David Hume sharpened the point by treating benevo-
lence as a "natural" virtue. 19 Hume argued, in effect, that unless
we are rare, defective specimens or are deliberately trained to the
contrary, we naturally take pleasure in the happiness and well-
being of others.20 These texts, together with a plausible reading of
empirical psychology, suggest the appropriateness of the following
modest assumption about benevolence: that although benevolence
is limited or mixed when the well-being of others exists at the ex-
pense of our own well-being, when such conflict is absent, pursuing
the welfare of others is as natural as pursuing our own.
If this assumption regarding human behavior is warranted, then
moral skeptics have the burden of showing why we should not act
out our limited benevolence. If benevolence is a given feature of
human motivation, and an individual can find no reason against
acting on it, then continuing to act on it is surely reasonable. One
may treat doing so as a rebuttable normative principle.2'
18. See JOSEPH BUTLER, BUTLER'S ANALOGY AND SERMONS 385-415, 484-511 (Oxford Univ.
ed., 1726) (sermons 1, 11, III, XI, XII).
19. DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 574-92 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon
Press 1896) (1739) (discussing the origins of our natural virtues and vices); see also DAVID
HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, 9-34, 113-27 (Charles W.
Hendel ed., Liberal Arts Press 1957) (1777) [hereinafter HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS].
20. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 19, at 113-27.
21. This strategy for shifting the burden of proof to skeptics is developed in detail in
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, ON JUSTIFYING MORAL JUDGMENTS 63-64 (1973).
[Vol. 34:89
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V. THREE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY
The elements of equality outlined above, together with a princi-
ple of limited benevolence, entail normative principles of equality
that have direct import for the Articles to follow. Three such prin-
ciples are equal consideration, equal happiness, and equal opportu-
nity. In large measure, however, the specific versions of the equal
expertise, worth, potential, power, vulnerability, and autonomy
doctrines that one chooses to accept will determine the precise
contours of these general principles.
A. Equal Consideration
If competent adults are equally expert at defining their own wel-
fare and equally ignorant about defining others', and if they have
equal powers and autonomy, then the burden of proof rests
squarely on anyone who wishes to treat groups of competent adults
differently in distributing benefits and burdens. Thus, distinctions
based on race, sex, age, and other factors require special justifica-
tion, and a comparable burden of proof rests on the advocates of
paternalistic intervention.
In his Article on fetal hazards, David Kirp recounts the wavering
record courts have had ruling on this aspect of the equal considera-
tion principle in cases affecting the employment of
women-especially women of childbearing age.22 Kirp suggests that
the Supreme Court's vigorous endorsement of the principle in In-
ternational Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,23 although ad-
mirable in most ways, may mean that courts will not address im-
portant public health matters in the future.
Using the analytical framework I have offered above, the
problems of equal consideration may be addressed in the following
way: If people are of equal worth, then each person counts as one
and only one in the pursuit of aggregate welfare. Moreover, a fun-
damental concern about equal protection of human potential exists
even when powers, expertise, and autonomy are not equal. Fetal
safety is, therefore, a legitimate equal protection issue. Further-
22. David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, Gender Justice, and the Justices: The Limits of
Equality, 34 Wzt. & MARY L. REv. 101 (1992).
23. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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more, all of the factors described above, plus equal vulnerability,
operate as a basis for concern for public health and safety; for ex-
ample, for preventing the social costs of crippling diseases or acci-
dents. They also support an interest in creating and sustaining an
environment in which people can have meaningful choices, not just
opportunities to make contracts of adhesion. The choice of under-
going sterilization in order to remain employed, in an environment
in which being unemployed means serious damage to the family
unit, is not a choice an individual should be forced to make if fea-
sible alternatives exist. The proper balance among these elements
of an equal consideration principle may be difficult to discern and
even harder to achieve, but policies that ignore such elements are
unsatisfactory.
B. Equal Happiness
If people are of equal worth and potential, and one ought to
value their well-being, then (on the standard formal principle that
better is preferable to good and best is preferable to better) it fol-
lows that one ought to promote the fullest feasible happiness for
others as well as one's self. And the formal principle of equality
supports an equal happiness rule in the pursuit of aggregate wel-
fare. Further, to the extent that people are equally expert in defin-
ing the conditions of their own happiness, equally ignorant in do-
ing the same for others, and have autonomy, vulnerability, and
power in equal measure, it seems wise to resist the temptation to
try to guarantee results here rather than opportunity.
Jennifer Hochschild, in her Article on the American dream, as-
sesses the uneasy fit between various ideals of equal happiness and
perceived possibilities within the framework of characteristically
American commitments to liberal democracy.24 She notes that we
may define happiness in terms of absolute success, that is, better-
ment by approximation to some threshold of well-being; relative
success, betterment in terms of our preexisting situation; or com-
petitive success, besting an opponent. The definition we adopt will
have "profound[] . . .normative and behavioral consequences."'2 ,
24. Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Word American Ends in "Can": The Ambiguous Prom-
ise of the American Dream, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 139 (1992).
25. Id. at 142.
[Vol. 34:89
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Imposing further conditions on her subtle analysis no doubt
presents the danger of distorting it, but pointing out three things
may be useful. The first is that the elements of equality outlined
above give no support to an ideal of competitive success; in fact,
equal worth, potential, and vulnerability point away from it. If
besting an opponent is a part of the American dream, then it
comes from other sources. Second, to the extent that equal exper-
tise and autonomy imply radical pluralism about what counts as
individual welfare, they undercut the notion of absolute success;
there is no single or absolute standard to be approximated. It is
true that one may invoke such pluralism cynically, to cover a re-
fusal to take the welfare of others seriously. It is also true, how-
ever, that well-intentioned efforts to promote others' welfare can
fail because the efforts fail to take pluralism seriously. Third, cast-
ing the American dream in terms of having the opportunity to bet-
ter oneself continually with respect to one's current condition is
congruent with all the elements of equality outlined here.
C. Equal Opportunity
If people are of equal worth, expertise, power, potential, and au-
tonomy, and if each individual should promote the happiness of
others but finds them vulnerable to misfortune and evils of other
sorts, then the individual should protect the vulnerable. In particu-
lar, protecting opportunity will be appropriate because it preserves
autonomy. The formal principle of equality also supports an equal
opportunity rule.
David Strauss, in his Article on equal opportunity, considers two
definitions of the normative force of that concept.26 The first de-
fines equal opportunity as a guarantee that arbitrary factors, such
as race, sex, or social class, do not determine people's welfare.27
The second is a guarantee that people are able to go as far as their
abilities and talents can take them. 2s Strauss argues that, in either
case, achieving genuine equality of opportunity is tantamount to
achieving equality of results. In the first case this is so, he says,
26. David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and
Equality of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 171 (1992).
27. Id. at 173.
28. Id. at 173, 181.
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because the distribution of talents and the supportive human rela-
tionships in which talents develop is as arbitrary a factor in one's
welfare as race or sex.29 Neutralizing the effect of all such arbitrari-
ness would require massive social intervention at the level of the
family, and produce substantial equality of results.30 The second
case appears more complicated because defining equal opportunity
as an equal chance to employ whatever talents one has been given
seems designed to permit inequalities achieved meritocratically.
Despite this incongruity, Strauss argues that when one considers
the arbitrariness of the social structures that reward some talents
highly and ignore others, and then considers the sort of interven-
tion that would be necessary to correct for such arbitrariness, one
may again conclude that achieving genuine equality of opportunity
would collapse into an effort to guarantee equal results.3 '
The elements of equality outlined above suggest at least one
complication for Strauss' thesis. The difficulty comes from the plu-
ralism suggested by the commitment to regarding individuals as
the best judges of what counts as welfare in their own cases, and
from the general hands-off policy suggested by equal expertise,
power, potential, and autonomy. A direct effort to guarantee equal
results clearly contradicts the concepts of pluralism and noninter-
vention. Thus, commitment to equal opportunity may be as much
a commitment to avoiding adverse intervention as it is a commit-
ment to enabling individuals to flourish. On this account, the equal
opportunity principle means three things: first, that we should not
adopt policies that impose arbitrary burdens on people-burdens
that limit the individual's opportunities to develop and flourish;
second, that we should adopt policies that enable people to develop
and flourish as autonomous agents; and finally, that we should be
careful not to violate the first goal in the pursuit of the second, and
vice versa. This complex objective is logically coherent. Whether
we can reasonably expect to achieve it, or even reasonably choose
to pursue it, is a separate question.
29. Id. at 175.
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id. at 178.
[Vol. 34:89
